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Abstract
One important method in reducing poverty was through finance.The poor were lack of qualification and
capacity to borrow from formal financial sector. Therefore they should resort their financing needs to informal
sources albeit very high cost implication.This dependency in turn would disrupt their productive capacitysince
the interest was very high. We focus on special segment of theproductive poor. We reviewed various financing
scheme that widely practiced both domestically and globally. We perceived that existing schemes were inad-
equate from several perspectives: (1) partial nature, (2) substandard business practices, (3) lack of cooperation
and (4) limited coverage. We proposed an alternative financing scheme.The spirit of the approach emphasized
the critical role of self-sufficiency of Microfinance Institution (MFI). Through self sufficiency, MFI could
develop a healthy business with reasonable rate of return. In addition to self sufficiency, first, the proposal also
included financing from private sector through mobilization of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds.
The funding sources became broad and economics scale could be achieved. Second, the proposal improved risk
sharing mechanism by introducing the regional government banks as well as insurers. Third, the proposal
made the distribution channel optimum by involvement of society elements.
Key words: micro finance, poverty elimination, network optimization, productive poor
One purpose of economic development (growth) is
reducing poverty. Indeed there has been a
concensus that growth would lose its meaning if it
fails to improve the standard of living of majority
of the society (Ray, 1997 and Bardhan & Udry,
2000). In this regard there have been a tremendous
effort (both practical and scientific) to search the
most effective way to improve the living quality
for those in the bottom of society.
Economic literature has long recognized the
role of financial vulnerability of the poor as the
major force of inavoidance of poverty vicious circle.
Most of the poor do not have adequate income and
collateral to access to formal financial sector. There-
fore they often turn to informal sector (like rela-
tives, friend and money lender) to meet the finan-
cial needs. Informal sectors like money lenders (loan
shark) often charge inexorbitant rate for the ser-
vice. It is not surprising that the poor find them-
selves in difficult position to pay the debt. They
offer any assets left or taking loan from another
informal sector player (ponzi game), thus sustain-
ing the poverty circle (Barman, et al. 2009).
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To break the spell, various micro financing
schemes has been experimented in various coun-
tries. The schemes ranging from outright grant to
the poor (cash transfers), cooperatives, village fi-
nancing unit run by the state (or regional govern-
ment) and society empowerment programme run
by non governmental organization (NGO). Thus far
there does not seem to be a convergent result. An
experiment succeeded in a region, might yield a
poor result when applied in another.
One of major break through in micro finance
occurred in 1976 by the commencement of Grameen
Bank. Yunus, a Bangladesh nationals and an Ameri-
can trained economist, troubled by chronic poverty
in his environment conducted an experiment. In his
experiment, he lent money to a group of five women
to finance a small handy craft business. Unlike stan-
dard terms, the loan is given to all the group mem-
ber in a condition should one fail to pay its debt all
the member would suffer the consequences (that is
have to return the money immediately and be de-
nied from future loan). He required no collateral
for the loan. His experiment succeeded and evolved
to a business that attract the attention of the
government.The government agree to finance his
experiment therefore established the Grameen
Bank. The Bank enjoys a fine return: 25%+Return
On Equity and 98% repayment rate (Morduch,
1999).
Micro finance institutions (MFIs) has grown
significantly especially since the new millenium.
From 1997, number of MFIs have increased from
655 to 3352 with clients expanded from 16.5 mil-
lions to 154.8 millions. Still this number is far from
satisfactory since it is predicted that 30% of global
population (around 2.5 billions) lives below
poverty.Therefore the coverage of MFIs financial
service is far from adequate. Nevertheless 16% an-
nual growth is very encouraging.
Tabel 1. Evolution of MFIs
Source: Dale & Harris (2009)
Table 2. Distribution of Microfinance Institutions
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) from
sample survey 2002-2004
To our knowledge a reliable global database
on microfinance figures is not available yet. Data on
MFIs mostly is gathered on separate basis or through
survey. There are few institutions that collecting data
and doing microfinance analysis, one of the most
notable is Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX).
One of recent survey conducted by MIX provide an
interesting picture on the state of MFIs (see Table 1).
NGO and Non Bank Financial Institution (NBFI) are
major playersin microfinance business (with shares
around 75%). However in terms of business acquisi-
tion, they are still significantly below banks (whose
share is around 55%).
One feature of microfinance that makes it spe-
cial is the nature of object: the productive poor. We
could view the productive poor as an intersection of
two different populations: the poor and home in-
dustry. The poor contains elements such as handi-
capped persons, malnourished and extreme poor
End of 
Year 
Total 
Numbers of 
Institutions 
Total Number 
of Clients 
Reached 
(millions) 
Number of “Porest” 
Clients Reported 
(millions) 
1997 655 16.5 9.0 
1998 705 18.7 10.7 
1999 964 21.8 13.0 
2000 1,477 38.2 21.6 
2001 2,033 57.3 29.5 
2002 2,334 67.8 41.6 
2003 2,577 81.3 55.0 
2004 2,814 99.7 72.7 
2005 3,056 135.2 96.2 
2006 3,244 138.7 96.2 
2007 3,352 154.8 106.6 
 
 % of institutions 
% of 
assets 
% of 
borrowers 
% of 
female 
borrowers 
% 
subsidired 
funds 
Bank 10 55 25 6 18 
Nongovernmetal 
Organization 
(NGO) 
45 21 51 73 61 
Nonbank 
Financial 
Institutio (NBFI) 
30 19 17 16 18 
Credit Union 10 4 6 4 3 
Rural Bank 5 1 1 1 0 
 100 100 100 100 100 
Numbers Total 346 Institutions 
$28.3 
billion 18 million 12 million 
$2.6 
billion 
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(expenditure less than USD 2 per day). This group is
extremely vulnerable and difficult to empower thus
subject to state care through social safety net.
ably high rate to micro customers. Better scheme
could be proposed to improve the risk sharing
mechanism that will result in cheaper credit.
The standard channel could be expanded to
include various parties like village elders, suppli-
ers, shops, etc. Developing the product channel
would increase efficiency and coverage of
microfinance.
In this study we depart on an intensive lit-
erature study on the field of microfinance. Spe-
cifically we focus our attention on the issue of self
sufficiency (sustanability) and review of existing
practices. We take a stand on one of the two com-
peting paradigm in micro finance, namely
sustanability. We strongly agree on the idea that
in order to achieve its objective effectively, MFIs
should adhere to the conventional business prac-
tices princples: maximizing profit subject to re-
sources constraint. That is in Prahalad (2010) fa-
mous jargon: doing well by doing good.
We also review various existing practices,
not only in Indonesia but also global. We take a
note to each strengths and weakneses. The
institutionals, sociological and cultural feature have
also been our interest. The findings then are re-
lated to Indonesian set up. Our objectives is to
propose a business model of micro finance that
would work best in local environment.
To this end, the exposition is divided to five
sections. The first section summarizes the evolu-
tion of thinking in micro finance. This part would
open the way to the discussion of various existing
micro finance products and practices. The third
section will give a picture on current state of mi-
cro finance in Indonesia that would give sugges-
tion on how a best scheme could be structured. In
the next section we will combine the various find-
ings obtained from the literature study and pro-
pose (hopefully) optimal and workable scheme
(called MFS-ON). The exposition is concluded in
section five.
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On the other hand, there is a group who is
also poor but with a markedly significant economic
capacity. Elements in this group are willing and able
to improve their economic and social status.A part
of this group might be well endowed that enable it
to access market/commercial source of financing by
its own. We call this segment as home industry. There
is also a part that is unable to obtain commercial
source due to lack of skill and insufficient collateral.
This part is the main target of our proposed financ-
ing scheme.
Despite its young age, there is considerable
huge amount of literature in micro finance. The think-
ing evolution covers paradigm, belief, theories and
practices. Nevertheless, the school of thoughtis still
far from maturity. Our investigation to existing
literatureoffers some opportunities for scientific ef-
forts. (1) There is conflicting paradigm on the role of
MFI. One strand argue for emphasizing on business
motive and another focus on social business. We take
a stand and argue for the superiority of business
motive. (2) Most schemes are based on either state
funding or private funding. We argue a better fund-
ing base would be obtained if we could combine both
source. Here we outline how that could possibly
done. With larger funding base, better performance
in terms of sustanability and outreach could be
reached. (3) The conventional practices based on a
standard risk pricing hence imply a still consider-
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Perspectives in Micro Finance
Micro finance evolves as a unique discipline
following a break through on intermediation prac-
tice introduced by Yunus: The Grameen Bank.
Though economists have long recognized the piv-
otal role of empowerment financial aspects of the
poor, no systematic and coherent framework has
been applied to address this issue.
Basically micro finance talk about delivering
financial services to lower end segment of society
with the aim to reduce poverty and increase living
standard (Ledgerwood, 1999; Robinson, 2000;
Aghion & Morduch, 2010). Yunus experiment has
opened substantial interest to new way of making
loan: group lending. This successful innovation sub-
sequently open various endeavour to lending prac-
tice such as involving elders, application of social
sanction and family lending (Khavul, 2010).
From academics perspectives micro finance has
evolvedmainly around two interests: the existance
and debate of sustanability vs outreach (Hermes &
Lensink, 2007). On the question of existance, academ-
ics try to answer how and why microfinance exist.
This strand is mainly theoretical with applies stan-
dard optimization tools in microeconomics (Basu,
1997 and Bardhan & Udry, 2000). In earlier phase,
the school of though is dominated by issue of equi-
librium credit rationing of Mac Kinon & Shaw (1963)
and its causes. Various theories like adverse selec-
tion (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), moral hazard (Bester,
et al. 1987), costly state verification (Williamson, 1987)
and segmented market (Basu, 1997) are offered to
explain the phenomenon.
Later on the strand focus on more to institu-
tional set up and environment of micro finance.
Stiglitz (1991) propose the first theoretical exposi-
tion on group lending, a practice popularized by
Yunus. He shows that group lending practice (known
also joint liability) could circumvent adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard, two major hazards in stan-
dard individual lending. His theoretical work sparks
more interest and subsequently followed by major
works, most notable are the role of social capital
(Besley, et al., 1995), peer monitoring (Banarjee, et
al., 1994) and family ties (Sharma, et al., 1997).
Second issue that draw much interest on
microfinance is the debate of sustanability vs out-
reach (Robinson, 2001). Microfinance aims to reduce
poverty by providing capital (loanable fund) at suf-
ficient quantity and attainable cost. Nevertheless it
is admitted thatmicrofinancing is expensive due to
transaction and information cost (Hermes, et al.,
2007). Therefore the field again face with standard
economic problem, maximizing the amount of pov-
erty reduction subject to available funds. The pro-
ponents of sustanability and outreach are disagree
with how to cope with this resource constraint.
The sustanability school of thought (also know
as financial system approach, Hulme, et al., 1996) ar-
gue that in order to meet the objective, MFI should
rely on self sufficiency. The term self sufficiency
means that MFIs could obtain adequate return to
cover all cost: operational, investment and return to
shareholders (Aghion & Morduch, 2010). In this re-
gard, the ultimate objective of Microfinance: pov-
erty reduction could be reached in sustained basis.
One critical arguement underlying the finan-
cial system paradigm is the scale of poverty (Cull, et
al., 2009). Poverty is of a massive scale in most of the
countries that no state run (public) program could
be credibly run in an efficient and accountable man-
ner. Here, a self help program is much better through
providing capital and other financial access (Beck, et
al., 2007). However the study by Hulme, et al. (1996),
Khandker (2005), Cull, et al. (2009) and Parameshwar,
et al. (2010) find the evidence that more subsidy reli-
ant entities (such as NGOs) are showing inferior
performance than conventional MFIs (such as rural
banks). Figure 2 presents a somewhat contrasting
performance between the not for profit organiza-
tion and standard profit maximazing entities.We
could also add corruption, bureaucracy inefficiency
and abuse by community (intended non repayment)
to the problem of (subsidized) micro lending (Ray,
1997).
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Figure 2. Performance MFI in India
Source: Parameshwar, et al. (2010)
The sustanability approach to micro lending
prove to be more appealing and business friendly.
One most cited example of successfull MFI is Banco
Compartamos in Mexico (Rosenberg, 2007 and
Malkin, 2008). The bank offers 30% of its shares
worth of USD 1.6 billion to public in April 2007.
The initial public offering was successfull in which
the shares sales was oversubscribed by 13 times.
The poverty lending approach on the other
hand emphasize the importance of coverage and
outreach of microfinance program (Aghion &
Morduch, 2004). Proponents of this paradigm ar-
gue that the ultimate goal micro finance: alleviat-
ing poverty could only be effectively reached by
providing credit with subsidized interest rate
(Hermes, et al. 2007).
The heated debate between financial system
and poverty lending center around the goal to pro-
vide cheap fund to the poor. In this regard, the pro-
ponents of poverty lending distance themselves to
financial system by criticizing the latter as formal-
ization of money lender (Yunus, 2007). Yunus him-
self stress the role of microfinance as a “social
business”in which the rate should not be far from
the cost of funding (Malkin, 2008). We are not pur-
suing this topic further, interest reader could refer
to Fernando (2006) and Aghion & Morduch, (2010).
Micro FinancePractices and Products
Micro finance is not a new business venture.
However most of the scheme is standard. The loan
is given based on individual basis with own capi-
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tal. The practice resembles the conventional bank
in many ways. In addition to this traditional ap-
proach, there are several other schemes.In this sec-
tion we will outline some important development
and focus on their characteristics.
Several types ofmicro financingscheme con-
ducted in Indonesia include: (a) Partnership and
Environment Development Program (Program
Kemitraan dan Bina Lingkungan; PKBL). PKBL is a
certain form of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
program owned by the state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) with the vision of pro poor, projobs and
progrowth. The scheme is conducted based on Law
No.19 year 2003 and Minister of SOE decree No.
05/MBU/2007. In this scheme, state-owned com-
panies provide credit directly to MSMEs, or some-
times using cooperatives as channeling agents. (b)
Communal Micro Loan (Kredit Usaha Rakyat;
KUR). KUR is one of government programs to sup-
port the development of MSMEs in Indonesia based
on Presidential Directive No. 6 dated June 8, 2007.
Currently KUR is distributed via six authorized
banks: Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI), Bank Rakyat
Indonesia (BRI), Bank Mandiri, Bank Tabungan
Negara (BTN), Bank Bukopin and Bank Syariah
Mandiri (BSM). In this funding scheme, government
grants funds to the designated banks, which sub-
sequently disbursed loans to MSMEs and coopera-
tives in accordance with the requirements that are
owned by the bank. Funds disbursed by banks to
MSMEs and cooperatives are guaranteed by the two
companies that have been appointed by the gov-
ernment, namely Perum Sarana Business Develop-
ment (Perum SPU) and PT.Credit Insurance Indo-
nesia (PT.Askrindo) with a particular scheme
(Mulia, 2010). (a) Channeling funds through the
Regional Development Bank (Bank Pembangunan
Daerah; BPD). In this scheme, the fund is originated
from Regional Governments (from approved bud-
get allocation). The fund is placed on BPD to fi-
nance MSMEs. BPDcould ask for assistance and in-
put from MSMEs empowering teamorotheragen-
ciesin assessingthe feasibility of MSMEsand other-
technical matters. (b) Community empowerment
program. Recently several community empower-
ment programs emerge in various regions in Indo-
nesia. One of the most notable is Village Credit In-
stitution (Lembaga Kredit Pedesaan: LPD) in Bali.
This is largely a self help group in which a commu-
nity decide to set up a fund that could be used to
finance productive activities. Usually no or mini-
mum collateral is needed and repayment (credit
quality) is enforced by elders or village influential
individuals. There are two types of common scheme:
individual based lending and group lending. MFIs
could take various forms, both formal and infor-
mal. Formal institutions usually take a form of sepa-
rate entity and exclusively incorporated and run as
profit seeking unit. On the other hand, informal in-
stitutions usually operate in casual manner. The units
are not exclusively set up for financing purpose. Some
might provide as side service and other as comple-
ment to main activities. Table 3 provide common
MFIs found in Indonesia.
Formal MFIs Informal MFIs 
Branches  of Commercial Bank 
Community  Loan Bank 
Cooperatives 
Pawnshop 
Venture Capital 
Multi Finance Firms 
Families, Relatives and Friends 
Non Governmental 
Organization Money Lender 
Supplier  
Corporate Social Responsbility 
Program 
 
Table 3. Types of MFIs in Indonesia
Source: Arsyad (2008)
In addition to state run (or supported) micro
finance program like described above, there are sev-
eral notablefunding schemeundertakenabroad,
among others: (a) Grameen Bank. Started in 1976 by
Muhammad Yunus who has a goal to change the bad
cycles, “small income, little savings, and investing
their small”, lend funds so as to make a good cycle,
“a big investment, large income, and huge savings
“. Funding is done through a bank branch of the
Grameen Bank in disadvantaged areas. Selection is
then performed on several villages that are consid-
ered disadvantaged and selected a group of people
that show its commitment to doing business. Not
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everyone in the group could acquire funding from
the Grameen Bank, only the first two people who
attained their first eligible, then the next person must
wait until the loan from the first two men had been
paid off. Pressure from peer group will make the
first acquiring parties to comply with the credit re-
quirement. In addition, Grameen Bank gives leeway
to the credit receiver to start his first interest pay-
ment after 6 weeks of running. Grameen Bank is also
implementing regulations for the saving of some of
the benefits that can be used as an additional credit
to the group. (b) Branchless Banking (Chaia, et al.,
2010). Branchless Banking is a new distribution
model that allows financial institutions and non-fi-
nancial institutions other than banks to provide fi-
nancial services. Using this model will be more effi-
cient compared to opening a branch. There are two
models of the application of Branchless Banking
through other institutions outside the banks, namely
The Bank-Led model and the Nonbank-Led Model.
The Bank-Led Model is distribution through other
financial institutions. While the nonbank-Led Model
is distribution through non-financial institutions as
agents, such as mobile phones. Branchless Banking
has been implemented in several countries, includ-
ing Brazil, India, South Africa, the Philippines, and
Kenya. Each country has its unique characteristics in
applying this model. (c) Correspondent Banking
(Chaia, et al. 2010). Correspondent Banking has be-
come one of the promising strategies in financial ser-
vice provision in developing countries. This model
works by cooperating with some form of non-bank-
ing businesses, such as gas stations, post offices, and
others, to serve the financial services. This approach
is very effective in serving the community because it
minimizes the operating costs. There are four prin-
ciples to assist organizations in applying the strat-
egy of good correspondence, among others: (1) move
quickly to catch the earliest possible opportunity, (2)
build relationships with colleagues vigorously, (3)
offers a wide range of services; (4) held a service
that can be implemented quickly and can be updated
regularly.
MFIs have gone beyond traditional lending
business. The micro financial products could be
classified into 3 forms (Rhyne, et al., 2006 and
Steiger, et al., 2007). They are: (1) Credits: various
types of loans both for productive and consump-
tion purpose including credit card. (2) Savings:
mostly in form of savings deposit and time de-
posits. (3) Payment and Remittance: the need to
transfer fund/cash to other place including cash
collection. (4) Insurance: the need of protection
from cyclical production process and contingent
situation (disaster, calamity, disease, etc). (5) Aux-
iliaries: various types of complementary services
like training, marketing and partnership.
Eventhough MFIs have moved to a wide
spectrum of product, credits remain the backbone
of the business.
METHOD
The study is largely a literature review and
conceptual work. We study intensively theoretical
and empirical literature on micro finance. Observa-
tion and analysis are conducted on various existing
micro finance scheme to find a common link. We seek
to combine aspects of the various micro financing
scheme to arrive at an ideal scheme. In so doing, we
also pay attention to Indonesia domestic character-
istic (economic, sociological and cultural). The scheme
should not only be ideal but more important should
be applicable. To our knowledge, this kind of scien-
tific endeavour is still rarely conducted (see Prahalad,
2010 for example).
By observing the various Micro Finance pro-
grams that have been implemented at home and
abroad, we could deliver several critics. They are:
(1) The micro finance program is still partial. The
program has not involved all relevant parties. We
have either the state run the program or the private
but not the mixture.Though recently government has
provided capital injection to private run entities (like
the one experimented in Riau), we still regard the
scheme as suboptimal. (2) The cooperation that ex-
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ists is still not optimal. It should be realized that micro
finance is a complex process. They are many parties
involved in the business. Optimal performance in term
of superior quantity and price could only be deliv-
ered if every party exerts significant cooperation.
(3) Substandard business practices. Many parties in-
volved still think that micro finance is kind of char-
ity. Poor marketing and risk management practices
are performed. Even worse when the fund is ob-
tained from the government, both the lendersand
borrowers consider this fund as a form of grant that
does not require accountability. (4) Poor coverage.
The World Bank and CGAP report (2009) shows that
financial access to the lower partof society is inad-
equate. Based on an extensive survey in Indonesia it
is estimated that only 60% of population has access
to loanable funds and around 43% obtained from
informal institutions. The same survey also shows
that only 68% population saves, with 18% saves in
informal units.
Conceptual idea is built from a heuristic and
comprehensive point of view. In this regard, we iden-
tify major parties involved in micro financing scheme.
We study the connections and relationships among
the parties and contemplate how theycould be im-
proved. In line with the above critics, we aim to im-
prove the microfinance scheme along the following
aspects: (1) increased quantity of available funds; (2)
reduced cost to customers (lower interest rate and
other expenses); (3) Greater business coverage; (4)
Sound business practice and corporate governance
After considerable literature study and observ-
ing microfinance practices, we try to construct an
(hopefully) ideal scheme. We expect the scheme could
satisfy the required improvements above and also
could be implementable (with reasonable cost).
RESULT
Figure 3 below presents our proposed mi-
cro finance scheme called Microfinance Scheme
Based on Optimization of Network (MFS-ON).
There are 7 parties involved: government, corpo-
rations (through CSR programs), commercial
banks, credit insurance, MFIs, distribution chan-
nels and productive poor.
There are 5 business phases in the scheme,
namely: (1) Funding. Funding is initiated
bygovernment and corporation (through their CSR
programs).The fund is combined with commercial
banks deposits so as to produce larger quantities
pool at a cost that is still relatively low. Contribu-
tion (the percentage amount of funds) can be de-
termined in negotiations between all parties. By
mixing the fund with bank deposits, it is expected
thataccountability could increase. (2) Channeling
to the MFIs. MFIs have expertise and networks
among the productive poor and their distribution
channel, making it more effective compared with
(standard) banks branches/outlet. (3) Risk shar-
ing. Negotiation is conducted to distribute risk
premiums among commercial banks, MFIs, and the
government. In this regard, the residual premi-
ums borne by the MFI will be lower, which affects
the price of credit to the customera. (4) Endorse-
ment. Governments guarantee to credit insurance
is indispensable. With the guarantee, it will pro-
duce a sense of security to the lenders, commer-
cial banks and MFIs thus lowering overall risk
premium. (5) Distribution. These are marketing
channels of MFIs. It can be conducted through
community groups that stand out in the area (such
as farmer groups), companies which are the sup-
pliers of raw materials, the companies which are
the purchaser of products, or directly to the pro-
ductive poor themselves.
We will present an illustration to further
clarify the scheme. Suppose that all parties involved
agree to construct microfinance fund (The MFS-
ON).Thirty percentsof the fund comes from gov-
ernment with interest rate of 4%, 20% from CSR
with interest rate of 0% and 50% from commercial
banks deposits at an interest rate of 6%. By com-
bining these three sources, the fund has become
larger in value with still relatively lowinterest rate,
at 4.2% (based on weighted average).
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Figure 3. Microfinance Scheme Based on Optimization of Network: MFS-ON
A separate entity might not be needed to
manage the fund. Government and corporation
could set up a contract with the appointed com-
mercial banks. The contract includes among other:
(1) amount of the funds and share of each parties
(government, corporation and commercial banks).
(2) Purpose and specification of the loan (target
debtors, type of loans, maturities, interest rate and
requirements). (3) Channeling MFI (list and char-
acteristics). (4) Duration of the contract. (5) Other
terms and condition (rights, obligations, penalties,
conditionals and contingencies)
Credit insurance companies, commercial
banks, MFIs, and the government could negotiate
for the distribution of risk premiums. In this re-
gards the-eventual interest rate to debtors can be
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kept lowered, because of the risk premium is not
borne only by one party. In standard practice,
banks charge credit risk premium amounts up to
6% depending on collateral and business
prospects.In MFS-ON, other parties also bear the
risk premium hencea significantly lower residual
risk charge is attained.
Not all commercial banks could receive the
fund, only commercial banks that have linkages
to MFIs could.The MFIs should also be selected
based on availability and capacity to perform ex-
tensive network and good relationship to the pro-
ductive poor. The network can be constructed by
the bank with a variety of existing MFIs, such as
village credit institution, community loan bank,
cooperatives, and others. Owned network must
consider the circumstances of local communities
and do not forget the regulations carefully. In
addition, support from the surrounding environ-
ment is also indispensable.
DISCUSSION
We try to design alternative scheme to re-
solve the critics on current practices. To do this,
first we have to include the business spirit. We
are inspired by a prominent managerial book en-
titled “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid”
authored by C. K. Prahalad (first published in
2004).This land shifting book put forward an idea
of the need for a paradigm shift from a donation-
based business into profit-oriented business (Mak-
ing profit from eliminating poverty; doing weel
by doing good).
There are a large number of reasons why to
rely on profit oriented principle in running micro
finance scheme (Putterman, 1987; Hulme, et al.
1998; Fernando, 2006 and Schmidt, 2008). They are:
(1) increased sustanability since profit gathering
and capital preserveation become the center piece
of business activity. (2) Better governance due to
management of principal-agent problem. (3) Vigi-
lant adaptation to changes from environment and
market. (4) Greater expansion orientation due to
“animal” business spirit. (5) High quality product
due to innovation drive. (6) Cheaper price and
product offering due to competition. (7) Efficiency
and accountability to cope with market pressure.
Nevertheless too much emphasize on profit
motive also results in several drawbacks
(Fernando, 2006 and Yunus, 2007): (1) market
domination due to imperfect competition which
could result in higher Prince. (2) Social contro-
versy: taking profit from the poor. (3) Lack drive
to maximize coverage, as long as maximum profit
already reached.
Prahalad (2010) argues for the need of com-
prehensive perspective, so one can identify the role
of various parties involved, making network and
optimize the linkage between them. There are a
wide range of (potential) parties involved in mi-
cro financing: governments (central and regional),
central bank, credit insurance, MFIs, private and
state enterprises, productive poor and related
business chain members and community. Each
party could contribute in improving the overall
performance of microfinancing. By performance
we refer to quantity, price and asset quality.
Like a standard intermediation firm, micro
finance operates mainly through 3 phases (Freixas,
et al., 2008 and Mishkin, 2008). They are: (1) Fund-
ing collection. MFIs gather the necessary loanable
funds. There are 3 options of funding: internal (eq-
uity), external and mixture. (2) Managing
risks.There are 2 types of the most common risk(a)
liquidity risk, matching the pattern of cash inflow
and outflow and (b) credit risk, screening viable
debtors and maintaining repayment. (3) Product
distribution. Managing the channel in which MFIs
mostly distribute the product. This is a rather com-
plicated process considering demographic profile
of the customers (Bikbaeva, et al. 2009).
We could note three critical stages in the
scheme that needs further explanation. First, mo-
bilization of funding, the process of getting mul-
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tiple sources of cheap funds so as to produce a
large funding pool. The success in creating the pool
depends on cooperation and the availability of
formal binding among government, commercial
bank and corporation. Government plays a piv-
otal role in this process by arranging and enforc-
ing regulations and other institutional set up:
agreement and standard operating procedure.
Funding process could be improved by ac-
tive contribution of credit insurance. Credit insur-
ance could make an arrangement by which risk
premium on loanable fund could be allocated to
government, commercial bank and MFIs. The price
of credit could be significantly reduced if govern-
ment and commercial bank could offer substantial
coverage.
Second, fund distribution: the process to
channel theloan to productive poor.Demographic
and socio-cultural unique profile of this segment
warrants a distinctive approach (Mas, 2010). Con-
ventional practice by opening offices is believed
to have limited impact. We think that non conven-
tional approach by using community group, close
parties (like supplier or buyers) and other channel
(like families and friends) could be more effective.
Many empirical studies show that personal touch
are better in reaching this segment of society
(Hermes & Lensink, 2007).
The last critical stage is recovery, that is get-
ting back the money that has been lent.Standard
banking practice like restructuring could not be
workable (Epstein, et al. 2010). Instead, MFIs
should resort to (again) more personal approach.
MFIs could optimize the prevailing social capital
like cultural and religious profile, social sanctions,
family ties, inheritance and group lending to en-
force the credit contract (Aghion & Morduch, 2010).
According to Thompson, et al. (2005) Link-
age-network or who is often called a strategic al-
liance is very important in business. To understand
this, remember again the character of the loan or
credit. Credit has two elements forming the price,
namely the interest and non-interest components.
Interest consists of the cost of funds and the risk
premium, while non-interest consists of collateral
and procedures. The presence of linkage and the
network is intended to ease the burden posed by
these four components. Existing practices still fo-
cus on interest component, so that the problems
are solved partially.
Linkage and the network will resolvethe
credit problems: providing sufficient funding
while keeping interest rates cheap, as well as af-
fordable collateral and friendly procedures (Bar-
man, et al., 2009). For example, a venture capital
firm can provide training for community groups
on business feasibility study which is a require-
ment in credit application. In its application can-
not be forgotten other supporting factors, such as
regulatory adjustment to the situation of the tar-
geted (locality), socialization thoroughly on all
parties involved, and changes in credit-oriented
paradigm of social funds into a business orienta-
tion.
The application of this funding scheme will
involve all stakeholders in the development of liv-
ing standard of productive poor, resulting in more
available funds with low interest rate while in the
same time retain sound business principles. Nev-
ertheless the implementation of this scheme is not
without pitfalls. Thomson,et al.(2005) identifytwo
major threats to this network optimization frame-
work: (1) the possibility of friction and conflict and
(2) free rider problem.
Possibility of friction could be seen from the
scheme heavy reliance to cooperation. MFS-ON
involves parties with different (and sometimes
conflicting) interest. Government aims to cover as
many as possible productive poor, presumably for
political motive. Corporations want to maximize
a kind of return to social investment. We suppose
this could lead to efficacy of the program: success-
ful fund recipients. Banks and MFIs are offcourse
more interested in profit obtained.
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Reconciling these interest is not an easy task
in this regard an additional party could also be
involved. This party should have minimum inter-
est and has role as a negotiator and deal maker.
In addition, this party could also take a role of
supervisor. In our opinionthis partysuit best for
academic institution.
Other problem with cooperation game like
this is free rider.In this situation,contribution of
each party is less than optimum. In some cases, a
particular party could even refrain from contrib-
uting and instead free riding (Redondo, 2003) re-
sulting in overall suboptimal performance. To cope
with the problem we must resort the mechanism
design (Colel, et al. 1999). The contract should obey
participation and self selection constraint.
CONCLUSION
From the analysis and discussion above, we
could draw several conclusions: financial vulner-
ability of the poor is a major force behind the pov-
erty vicious circle. The poor often do not have
adequate income and collateral to access formal
financial sector. As a result they often have to re-
sort to informal sector with much higher interest
rate that subsequently deteriorate their wealth and
productive capacity.
Providing sufficient and reasonable priced
financial access could be seen as a way to reduce
proverty. This could be done through microfinance.
Following the breakthrough by Grameen
Bank in 1976, interest on microfinance rises sharply
both in practical and academical perspective.
Microfinance discourse mainly evolves around
existance and debate of sustainability versus out-
reach.
There are serious weaknesses in current
MSMEs financing (Micro finance program). They
are: (1) partial nature; (2) lack of cooperation; (3)
substandard business practices; and (4) poor cov-
erage. We have proposed a scheme to improve
existing practices. The proposalis based on network
optimization Micro Finance scheme based on Op-
timization of Network (MFS-ON).
Some important things to consider in the
application of alternative funding schemes include:
the need for extensive negotiations among all par-
ties concerned to avoid friction and conflict and
the regulations in accordance with the environ-
ment.
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